What level of respect does opposition to same-sex marriage deserve in a democratic society?

The opening of marriage to same-sex couples shifted the legal debate from whether that should be done to the extent to which individuals and organisations can lawfully refuse to engage with same-sex marriage or can continue to argue against such marriages. This raises the question of the level of respect that needs to be shown to antiLGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender) views in a democratic society, a question that ought to have been, but was not, the central issue in Lee v Ashers Baking Company Ltd. By focusing on the right not to express a view that the defendants in that case did not hold, the United Kingdom(UK) Supreme Court avoided examining the views that they did, in fact, hold. The defendants' belief that LGBT people are sinful, manifested in their opposition to same-sex marriage, is in essence a belief in heterosexual superiority, which is a form of homophobia and therefore inconsistent with the values underlying the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), especially that of dignity. This article explores the level of respect such beliefs and their expression can expect to receive in the UK. It concludes that it should be no higher than 'toleration'. It will identify as the central flaw in the Supreme Court's approach that it afforded a higher level of respect than toleration, that it allowed the belief in heterosexual superiority to exempt the defendants from a legal obligation that would have to be met by those whose views on homosexuality were more in line with the values of the ECHR.

本研究探讨了对同性婚姻的反对在何种程度上应受到《欧洲人权公约》（ECHR）第9条和第10条关于思想、良心和言论自由的保护，及其是否应被视为一种值得尊重的政治观点。通过对303 Creative LLC v. Elenis案、Lee v. Ashers Baking Company Ltd.案及Lee v. United Kingdom案的深入分析，本文质疑法院是否应将反对同性婚姻的观点与种族主义、反犹太主义或反伊斯兰教的观点区别对待，探讨这种反对是否属于民主社会中不可接受的歧视性言论，还是应作为一种合法的政治主张获得法律保护。

本研究采用法律文本分析与判例法比较的方法，重点审视英国最高法院在 Lee v. Ashers Baking Company Ltd. 案中的裁决逻辑与法律推理。首先，作者通过对该案及相关法律文件（如《欧洲人权公约》）的详细解读，分析法院如何界定被告拒绝提供服务的行为及其背后的反LGBTQ+信仰。其次，文章对比了其他涉及宗教信仰与反歧视法律冲突的案例，探讨法院对异性恋至上主义观点所赋予的法律保护是否与ECHR所倡导的平等与尊严原则相符。通过理论与实务结合，作者揭示了法院对恐同信仰赋予超出“容忍”标准保护的法律与价值冲突。

本研究指出英国最高法院在 Lee v. Ashers Baking Company Ltd. 案中存在两大核心缺陷。首先，法院将反对同性婚姻的立场与支持同性婚姻的立场赋予同等的法律尊重，忽视了前者与《欧洲人权公约》（ECHR）所倡导的平等与尊严原则不符，而后者则符合该原则，导致法院对异性恋至上主义的保护超出了现有判例法的合理范围。其次，法院对异性恋至上主义的保护力度显著高于对种族至上主义的保护，形成了一种倒退的合法性等级，隐含认为恐同比种族主义更可接受，这与欧洲人权法院的判例法相悖。该裁决不仅强化了恐同观点的合法性，还削弱了法律对LGBT群体安全与尊严的保护，反向抵消了反恐同仇恨言论法与同性婚姻合法化所传达的性取向平等的信息。